Cascading failures in power grids are inherently network processes, inwhich an initially small perturbation leads to a sequence of failures that spread through the connections between system components. An unresolved problem in preventing major blackouts has been to distinguish disturbances that cause large cascades from seemingly identical ones that have only mild effects. Modeling and analyzing such processes are challenging when the system is large and its operating condition varies widely across different years, seasons, and power demand levels.
Summary Figure: Cascade-resistant portion of the U.S.-South Canada power grid. The network is visualized on a cartogram that equalizes the density of nodes. (Top) Power lines that never underwent outage in our simulations under any grid condition are shown in green, whereas all the other lines-whose vulnerability varies widely-are in gray. (Bottom) Spreading of a cascade triggered by three failures at time t = 0 (arrows), which resulted in 254 failures at t = 100 (the end of the cascade in linearly rescaled time).
To quantify cascade vulnerability, we estimated the probability that each transmission line fails in a cascade. Aggregating the results from multiple conditions into a single network representation, we created a systemwide vulnerability map, which exhibits relatively homogeneous geographical distribution of power outages but highly heterogeneous distribution of the underlying overload failures. Topological analysis of the network representation revealed that the transmission lines vulnerable to overload failures tend to occupy the network's core, characterized by links between highly connected nodes. We found that only a small fraction of the 2 transmission lines in the network (well below 1% on average) are vulnerable under a given condition. When measured in terms of node-to-node distance and geographical distance, individual cascades often propagate far from the triggering failures, but the set of lines vulnerable to these cascades tend to be limited to the region in which the cascades are triggered. Moreover, large cascades are disproportionately more likely to be triggered by initial failures close to the vulnerable set.
Our results imply that the same disturbance in a given power grid can lead to disparate outcomes under different conditions-ranging from no damage to a large-scale cascade. The association between large cascades and the triggering failures' proximity to the vulnerable set indicates that the topological and geographical properties of the vulnerable set is a major factor determining whether the failures spread widely. Because the vulnerable set is small, failures would often repeat on the same lines in the absence of interventions. Although the power grid represents a complex system in which changes can have unanticipated effects, our analysis suggests failurebased allocation of resources as a strategy in upgrading the system for improved resilience against large cascades.
3
Cascading failures are inherently large-scale network processes that cannot be satisfactorily understood from a local or small-scale perspective. In blackouts caused by cascading failures in the power grid, a relatively small local disturbance triggers a sequence of grid component failures, causing potentially large portions of the network to become inactive with costly outcomes.
In the North American power grid (1) , for instance, a single widespread power outage can inflict tens of billions of dollars in losses (2) , and smaller but more frequent outages can amount to a yearly combined impact comparable to that of the largest blackouts (3). Yet, not much is known about what distinguishes disturbances that cause cascades from seemingly identical ones that do not. Despite the significant advances made through conceptual modeling of general cascades (4-10) and physics-based modeling of power-grid-specific cascades (11) (12) (13) (14) , a major obstacle still remains: the lack of realistic large-scale models and a framework for analyzing cascade vulnerability under variable system conditions. Developing such a framework is challenging for three reasons: (i) detailed data combining both structural and dynamical parameters are scarce, (ii) the system condition varies on a wide range of time scales, and (iii) computational resources required for modeling grow combinatorially with system size (15) . These challenges have limited the applicability of most previous studies to vulnerability under a single condition and either to smaller scales than those required to describe large cascades or to models that are not constrained by real data. Similar hurdles exist in studying large-scale failures in the broader context of complex networks (16) (17) (18) , including extinction cascades in ecological systems (19) (20) (21) and contagion dynamics in financial systems (22, 23) .
Here we focus on the U.S.-South Canada power grid, which is the largest contiguous power grid amenable to modeling. This system is composed of three interconnections (Texas, Western, and Eastern; Fig. 1A ), which are separate networks of alternating current generators and power consumers connected by transmission lines (network components are illustrated in Fig. 1B ).
To study this system, we used the data reported in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 715. For each interconnection, the data represent various snapshots of the system, spanning the years 2008-2013 and covering multiple seasons as well as both on-and off-peak demand levels, which correspond to different operating conditions. Basic properties of the 46 snapshots we used are listed in Table S1 . A representation of each snapshot was constructed by processing the parameters of individual power-grid components, including power generation and demand as well as the capacity of transmission lines. Central to the analysis of cascade vulnerability in this system is that our approach distinguishes (i) transmission lines (or simply lines) that do not carry flow because they have become out of service due to protective relay actions, equipment malfunctions, operational errors, or physical damages (primary failures); and (ii) lines that do not carry flow at the end of the cascades because they are de-electrified due to the outage of other lines (secondary failures).
Geographic layout of vulnerabilities
The vulnerability of a given transmission line can be quantified by the probability p that the line fails in a cascade event triggered by a random perturbation to a given snapshot of a given interconnection. To estimate p , we used a cascade dynamics model that combines key elements from previous models (12, 24, 25) to suitably account for the physics of cascading failures. In this model, the initial state of the system for the given snapshot is determined by computing the power flow over all transmission lines and transformers from the power flow equation (see Materials and Methods, Supplementary Materials). The triggering perturbation was implemented through the removal of a set of n t lines, representing line outages due to unforeseen events, such as damage to power lines caused by extreme weather and unplanned line shutdowns caused by operational errors. After this initial removal, a cascade event was modeled as an iterative process, with each step consisting of a single power line outage due to overheating (primary failure), followed by the redistribution of power flow in the network to compensate for the lost flow over the failed line. Line overheating is modeled by a temperature evolution equation (12) , and flow redistribution is determined by solving the power flow equation again; if a primary line failure disconnects the network into multiple parts with unbalanced supply and demand, the power generation and consumption in each part are adjusted (similarly to how generation reserves and power shedding are used in grid operation) to allow for the subsequent power flow calculation. The failure probability p was estimated from K such simulated cascade events, including those with no subsequent failures. Further details on the triggering perturbations and cascade dynamics model can be found in Materials and Methods, Supplementary Materials. We validated the model against historical line outage data available from the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) with respect to the distribution of cascade sizes measured by the number of (primary) line failures N f (Materials and Methods, Supplementary Materials, and Fig. S1A ). We also validated the extremal cascade size measured by N f and power shed P s (defined as the reduction in the amount of power delivered to the consumers) against the BPA data and grid disturbance data from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), respectively (Materials and Methods, Supplementary Materials, and Fig. S1 , B and C). All sim-ulations were performed with n t = 3, as the cascade size distribution for a given snapshot did not differ significantly for other choices of n t (Fig. S2) . However, the distribution exhibited considerable variation across different snapshots, both when cascade size was measured by the power shed P s (Fig. S3) , and when measured by the number of line failures N f (Fig. S4 ).
To aggregate results over different snapshots, we used a node to represent the set of all buses associated with the same geographic location across all snapshots in our dataset, where the term bus refers to a connection point between components of a power grid, such as transmission lines, transformers, and generators (Fig. 1B) . This definition of a node typically corresponds to a substation and can include generators at a nearby power plant and/or an electrical load representing local power consumption. We used a link between a pair of nodes to represent the set of all (parallel) transmission lines directly connecting the same pair of nodes in at least one snapshot, where each of these transmission lines connects two different buses (one from each node in the pair). In this network, the aggregated vulnerability p l := p of a link l, which we refer to as the A-vulnerability, is a weighted average of the failure probabilities over the lines represented by the link l and over the various snapshots:
where c indexes the different snapshot conditions simulated, and the sum over is limited to the set of transmission lines defining the link l for the given c. Here, p ;c is the probability of line failure in the simulated perturbations of the system (the values of K we used are given in Table S1 and justified in Fig. S5 ) and w c represents the weight assigned to each snapshot (Table S1). In our analyses, we present the A-vulnerability separately for primary failures denoted by p (p) , secondary failures denoted by p (s) , and the combination of both primary and secondary failures (denoted by p itself). We constructed the A-vulnerability map of the U.S.-South Canada power grid (shown in Fig. 2 , A to C, for a portion of the grid). Over the entire network, we found that only 10.8%
of all links ever underwent a primary failure in our simulations and that secondary failures were on average 3.77 times more prevalent than primary ones (Table S3 ). We also found that and Nebraska, which ranked 13th and 43rd in population density while having the 5th and 6th lowest A-vulnerability, respectively. The heterogeneity of A-vulnerability is visualized in Fig. 3A with a map representation that equalizes the density of nodes. The breakdown of this representation into primary and secondary failures, presented in Fig. 3 , B and C, shows that A-vulnerability to primary failures was more heterogeneously distributed than A-vulnerability to secondary failures. Over all pixels with nonzero A-vulnerability, the standard deviation of log p was 0.48 (89.2%), of log p (p) was 0.58 (57.5%) and of log p 
Network characterization of vulnerabilites
Our characterization of A-vulnerability allows us to study how the observed cascade dynamics depend on the network structure and to identify the topological centrality of individual links as a determinant. Topological centrality can be quantified through the concept of k-core (26) (27) (28) (29) , which is defined as the largest subnetwork in which every node has at least k links (that is, it has degree k). The k-core of a given network can be obtained by recursively removing all nodes with degree < k until all nodes in the remaining network have degree ≥ k. Repeating this for k = 1, 2, . . . determines the k-core decomposition of the network. The coreness of a node is then defined as the (unique) integer c for which this node belongs to the c-core but not to the 8 (c + 1)-core (30) . We further extend this concept to links by defining a link's coreness to be the smaller coreness of the two nodes it connects. Figure 4A illustrates a network visualization based on this decomposition.
When this network decomposition was applied to the entire topology of the U.S.-South Canada power system, we found that links of coreness 2 were dominant in all three interconnections (with 81%, 67%, and 82% of all links in the Texas, Western, and Eastern networks, respectively). This dominance of coreness 2 links was also observed for the cascade-prone por- (Fig. 4D ). This is probably because there are more flow paths (from power generators to consumers) that are parallel to a link of higher coreness in general, making the link more likely to be affected by flow rerouted from a failure in these paths.
For secondary failures, the fraction of links that were vulnerable and the A-vulnerability levels of these links followed opposite trends. The decrease in the fraction of vulnerable links shown in Fig. 4E can be understood by noting that a link can experience a secondary failure only if all available flow paths passing through that link are disabled by primary failures. As links of higher coreness generally have more such paths, they were less likely to fail through this mechanism. Among the vulnerable links, the increase of the average A-vulnerability with coreness shown in Fig. 4F likely arose from the organization of the nodes in each k-core into graph components (maximal subsets of nodes in which every node pair is connected by a network path). Whereas the 2-core formed a single graph component in all three interconnections, the nodes in the 3-core were organized into multiple graph components (3, 11, and 52 compo-nents for the Texas, the Western, and the Eastern network, respectively), which were connected sparsely with each other by coreness 2 links. Because of this structure, most secondary failures on links of coreness ≥ 3 were likely caused by primary failures on the surrounding links of coreness 2 that disconnected a 3-core graph component with no internal power generation from the other 3-core components. This would make the links in these components prone to repetitively undergo secondary failures together. This tendency of co-occuring failures (31) among vulnerable links would lead to higher A-vulnerability for those links than for links with lower coreness.
Relating triggers and network states to vulnerable lines
To characterize the lines at risk of primary failures, we now shift our attention back to individual transmission lines connecting buses in each snapshot, rather than their collective representation as links. For this purpose, we define a vulnerable transmission line for a given snapshot t o be a line for which p (p) > 0.0005 with at least 95% Wilson's confidence level (32) (which excludes any line with a single failure in 1,000 simulated events). This approach for vulnerability analysis is in contrast to previous studies on identifying the line failure combinations that initiate large cascading failures (i.e., a single snapshot) (25, 33) . We then define the vulnerable set V to be the set of all vulnerable lines for the given snapshot. We found that these vulnerable sets not only represented small portions of the grid in each snapshot but also exhibited considerable overlap across different snapshots (although it was rare for the same line to be vulnerable in all snapshots). These findings are presented in Table 1 for each interconnection using, respectively, the weighted average |V| of the number of vulnerable transmission lines over all snapshots and the number |V ∩ | of lines that were vulnerable in two or more snapshots (relative to the number expected if the vulnerable sets were randomly distributed with no correlation). Having a small portion of the grid vulnerable to cascading failures does not imply that these failures stayed localized even for single snapshots. To quantify the degree to which cascades were localized, we used the concepts of topological distance (the number of links along the shortest paths in the network) and geographical distance (the arc length along the Earth's surface), both normalized by the size of the triggering region measured by the respective distances The analysis of vulnerable sets provide relevant insights not only into the origins of cascading failures, but also into the size of the damage inflicted on the network by individual cascades.
In particular, what is the difference between the perturbations that cause large cascades and those that do not? To answer this question quantitatively, we categorized cascades according to their sizes measured by the power shed P s defined above: small cascades (0.01MW ≤ P s < 300MW) and large cascades (P s ≥ 300MW). This choice of measure and threshold is based on the NERC requirement that all blackouts causing more than 300MW of lost power be reported.
We characterized perturbations by three different measures based on (normalized) distances: d t-t , defined as the average pairwise distance among the n t triggering line failures, as well as d t-v and g t-v , defined as the minimum topological and geographical distances, respectively, from one triggering line failure to the vulnerable set V. Figure 5 shows the average of these distances (d t-t , d t-v , andḡ t-v ) over cascades in each size category for each region. Cascades resulting in power shed P s ≥ 300MW were associated with a set of triggering line failures that were topologically closer to each other (Fig. 5A) , as well as with triggering failures that occurred topologically and geographically closer to a vulnerable line (Fig. 5 , B and C).
Conclusions
Our vulnerability analysis of a continent-wide power system distinguishes itself from most previous studies by its scale, but also by accounting for: (i) the physics of cascading failures (DC-approximated power flow redistribution and heating of line conductors); (ii) grid operation practices (generation reserves and power shedding); and (iii) a wide range of conditions across years, seasons, and power demand levels (over which the average cascade size varies by one to two orders of magnitude). A strength of our approach is that it consists of tools-the definition of vulnerable sets, the method for aggregating multiple network conditions, and the analysis of coreness-vulnerability correlations-that are applicable to any cascade-prone network.
Our analysis separates the set of all failures occurring in cascade events into primary failures, which define the vulnerable set and account for only 1/5 of all failures, and secondary failures, which are more uniformly distributed and, albeit more numerous, are a mere consequence of the primary ones. The vulnerable set is not only surprisingly small but also highly skewed-with few lines far more likely to undergo a primary failure than the others-and patchy even when we control for the heterogeneity in the geographic organization of the grid. Although the vulnerable set is widespread through the network, the portion of it recruited in each cascade is not, and is in fact strongly spatially correlated with the location of the triggering line failures; this is counter to the perception that cascades [for being nonlocal with respect to both topological and geographical distances (31, 38) ] can spread essentially without spatial constraints.
Our analysis also shows that larger cascades are associated with co-occurring perturbations that are closer both to each other and to the vulnerable set. This validates the existing hypothesis that localized triggering failures amount to bigger cascades (39) and reveals a striking relation to the classic threshold model (4) used to describe behavioral cascades in social systems, where large cascades tend to be triggered by perturbations adjacent to the set of "early adopters." This set corresponds to the nodes most susceptible to change and thus plays a role similar to the one the vulnerable set plays in our analysis. The network topology emerged as a significant factor in determining the risk of cascading failures in our analysis based on the k-core decomposition, which has also been used to characterize nodes that serve as efficient spreaders in contact-based processes (40) . There are never two identical cascades in a network. It may thus come as a surprise that (primary) failures in large cascades are constrained to only a small subset of the network, which will likely experience new failures in the absence of remediating actions. This offers a scientific foundation for failure-based allocation of resources, which in the case of a power grid would be based on prioritizing upgrades of the system on the basis of previous observed failures (13)-but only if those are the primary (as opposed to all) failures (although upgrading transmission line capacities in the vulnerable set could create new vulnerable lines outside the set). Future work will be needed to determine the extent to which this applies to other flow networks that are subject to repeated failures, such as supply chains, food webs, and traffic networks.
Methods summary
For each interconnection, the system was modeled as a network of buses connected by transmission lines, given the parameters of individual network components in a given snapshot. The triggering perturbations were chosen uniformly from all lines for the Texas and Western networks, whereas for the Eastern network, they were chosen uniformly within one of the six regions defined by NERC ( Fig. 1A and Table S2 ). The initial state of the network and the redistribution of power flow following a line removal were both calculated by solving an equation that expresses a balance between incoming and outgoing power flows at each bus. Through a temperature evolution equation, the heating of a transmission line was modeled as an exponential convergence to the equilibrium temperature determined by the power flow over that line.
Mechanisms responsible for the primary failures occurring in a given simulated cascade were identified using an algorithm we developed to determine the degree to which the change in each generator's output contribute to changes in individual line power flows.
The density-equalizing transformation used to generate 
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Figs. S1 to S7 Tables S1 to S3 Table S2 ): the mean pairwise topological distance between the triggering failures (A), the topological distance between the set of triggering failures and the vulnerable set (B), and the geographical distance between the set of triggering failures and the vulnerable set (C). The distances are averaged separately over large cascades (blue, P s ≥ 300MW) and over small cascades (red, 0.01MW ≤ P s < 300MW). In each case, the distances are further averaged over all snapshots. Error bars mark the estimated standard deviation.
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Triggering perturbation. For a given snapshot of a given interconnection, we model the initial perturbation that triggers a cascade event as the removal of a fixed number n t of randomly chosen transmission lines. For the Texas and Western interconnections, we choose these lines uniformly from all lines present in the snapshot. For the Eastern interconnection (the largest of the three), we constrain the line selection to one of the six regions defined by NERC (Fig. 1A and Table S2 ), but with the event then evolved through the entire interconnection. This choice accounts for the intuition that failures in geographical proximity are more likely to trigger large cascades, which we quantitatively verified (Fig. 5 ) and is consistent with the empirical observation that blackout-causing perturbations tend to be localized (3).
Modeling cascade dynamics. Each iteration of our simulation begins with the removal of a line that models an overload failure (or of the n t lines chosen as the initial perturbation for the first iteration). If the network remains connected after the removal, the redistribution of power flow is calculated by solving the DC power flow equation, as described in a section above.
The DC approximation offers the computational efficiency that allows for the simulation of cascading failures in large-scale networks and is commonly used in the engineering community (13, 14, 24, 25) . If the grid separates into isolated sub-grids after the line removal, the following procedure is taken to rebalance supply and demand, which allows for the calculation of the redistributed power flow. For each sub-grid with unbalanced total power generation and consumption, we first select a generator with the largest capacity as a "slack bus" (a generator whose output can be adjusted between zero and its maximum generation output on short time scales) and adjust its output as much as possible within the range allowed; the slack bus models the role of generation reserves typically designed into real power grids. If this does not result in balanced supply and demand in a sub-grid, we uniformly scale down the output of all generators or the consumption (load) at all buses in the sub-grid to achieve a balance, depending on whether the supply is larger or smaller than the demand. The latter case, in which the total consumption is reduced, models power shedding procedures used by grid operators. Applying this procedure to all isolated sub-grids, we obtain the redistributed power flow over the network.
Given the redistributed power flow, the next line outage (if any) is identified by modeling the heating of line conductors using a temperature-evolution model (12) . Specifically, the temperature of line at time t (measured from the time of flow redistribution within this iteration) is determined by its power flow P through
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where T e (P ) := α µ P 2 + T a is the equilibrium temperature [to which T (t) approaches as t → ∞ according to Eq. (S1)], the constants µ and α are determined by the properties of the line (assumed to be the same for all for simplicity), and T a is the ambient temperature. This is a simplified version of the temperature-evolution model used in Ref. (12) . Similar temperature models have also been used for IEEE test systems in recent studies focusing on mitigating cascades (43) and evaluating cascade risk (44) . The capacity of the line P max (extracted from the dataset) is associated with the critical temperature T := T e (P max ) above which the line would become overheated. According to Eq. (S1), sustained power flow P > P max would bring the line temperature to the critical temperature T at t = t := −
. When this occurs, we remove line from the network (primary line failure) to model the action of a protective relay that automatically shuts down the line to prevent permanent damage. Note that the critical temperature T serves as a proxy for other failure criteria, such as those based on various stability considerations. The next iteration then begins with the removal of the line with the smallest t , followed by the update of the temperature of all the other lines to the value given by Eq. (S1) for t = min t and the recalculation of the power flow. We repeat this process of line removal and power flow redistribution until no line is overheated (i.e., T e (P ) ≤ T or, equivalently, P ≤ P max , for all ), which generates a (finite) sequence of line failures with time stamps, along with the total power shed. At the beginning of the cascade event, the temperature of all lines are assumed to be equal to the ambient temperature, T (0) = T a for all , which ensures that the failure sequence and power shed do not depend on T a , α, or µ.
Model validation. We validated the cascade model against available historical data on cascades in the Western interconnection. We compared the size of cascades from simulations and from the observed real events in terms of two different measures: the number of primary line failures N f and the power shed P s . Considering the scarcity of public data on line outages (primary failures), we used the portion of the Western interconnection represented in the BPA data as a proxy for the entire network. Following the criteria in Ref. (45), we identified the individual cascades by grouping the outages based on their temporal proximity, which resulted in 5,227 cascade events from the recorded 8,864 transmission line outages, each triggered by a set of varying number of line failures that was also identified from the data. To compare with this historical data, we simulated cascades using all available snapshots of the Western interconnection. For this purpose the number of triggers n t is chosen randomly following the probability distribution P (n t ) estimated from the data. We generated a total of 10 6 simulated events, with the numbers for individual snapshots chosen to be proportional to the weights in Table S1 . Figure S1A shows that the sample distribution of cascade sizes generated from these simulations is in good agreement with the distribution from real events when measured in terms of N f .
The NERC data includes 190 power outages reported between years 1984 and 2006, among which 93 cascade events have power shed larger than 300MW. The dataset formed by these 93 large cascades is believed to be complete and reliable given the NERC requirement on the reporting of cascades resulting in ≥ 300MW uncontrolled load. Using both the BPA and NERC data, we also validated the extremal cascade size (in terms of N f and P s , respectively) in our simulations against the historical data (Fig. S1 , B and C).
Density-equalizing maps. In the diffusion-based algorithm of Ref. (41), the distribution of nodes is represented by a density function ρ( r) and is then evolved to a uniform-density equilibrium through a linear diffusion process. Identifying mechanisms responsible for primary failures. In our cascade model, a given primary failure is caused either by the rerouting of power flow that occurs following the previous primary failure or by the adjustment of generator outputs that may occur when a part of the grid becomes disconnected from the rest (noting that consumption is only adjusted downwards and thus cannot by itself cause overloading). If the grid does not become disconnected, then flow rerouting must be responsible for the failure. If the grid becomes disconnected, the mechanism can be either flow rerouting, generator output adjustment, or both. In that case, we quantify the extent to which flow rerouting has caused the failure using the following algorithm. Let P (k) denote the power flow carried by line at the end of the kth iteration (just before the next line removal) and let ∆ (k) := P (k + 1) − P (k) be the total flow change on line from the kth to the (k + 1)th iteration. Then, the fraction f i of the flow P (k) that is supplied by generator i can be defined and computed using a flow tracing algorithm based on a proportional sharing 28 principle (46) . This fraction can be used to determine the amount of flow change ∆ 
quantifies the degree to which generation changes have contributed to the failure, if line fails at the beginning of the (k + 1)th iteration. The contribution of flow rerouting to the failure is then measured by
If the grid were not disconnected in that iteration, we would have ∆ (g) (k) = 0 and ∆ (r) (k) = ∆ (k), since the whole change would have been due to rerouting. To account for cases in which a line continues to be overloaded for multiple iterations before experiencing a primary failure, we keep track of running totals (48)] to approximate the 0.1% tail of the distribution. The p-value of the largest N f from the BPA historical data (black arrow) was found to be 0.42 under the hypothesis that the observed largest N f follows the generalized extreme value distribution (49) fitted to the histogram (red curve). (C) Same as (B) but for P s , using sets of 93 samples drawn from the probability distribution computed from simulations, considering only the large simulated cascades. Each maximum P s was adjusted by a factor (0.98) y to incorporate approximately 2% annual increase of the power demand, where y is an integer randomly chosen from 2 to 14 to trace back from the year of the simulated data (2008) to years of historical data . We found the p-value of the largest P s from the NERC historical data (black arrow) to be 0.07 under the hypothesis that the observed largest P s follows the generalized extreme value distribution fitted to the histogram (red curve). In both (B) and (C), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the real largest cascade size follows the fitted distribution at a significance level of 5%. Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the cascade size P s for large simulated cascades (≥ 300MW) triggered by disabling n t = 2 (blue), n t = 3 (green), and n t = 4 (red) power lines in the Western interconnection. For each n t , the CDF was calculated by combining the estimated distribution of P s for all snapshots using the weights given in Table S1 . The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (47) cannot reject the hypothesis that the size of cascades triggered by n t = 3 line failures has the same underlying distribution as of those triggered by 4 line failures (p-value = 0.22) or 2 line failures (p-value = 0.08). This supports the conclusion that the distribution does not depend sensitively on the size of the perturbation, even though the size of the largest cascade might. Table S1 . Tables S1 and S2 , respectively. We show the number of links N (p) N (s) whose A-vulnerability to primary (secondary) failures was nonzero in our simulations for each NERC region in which cascade events were triggered, along with the total for the entire network. Among the 83,099 links in the network, the number of links that experienced primary failures was 8,980 (10.8%). For the Eastern interconnection, there are overlaps between the failed links in cascades triggered from different regions, which is the reason why the number of links that fail in the entire interconnection is smaller than the corresponding number summed over the six regions. For comparison, the second and third columns list the total number of nodes and links, respectively. For the Eastern interconnection, these totals are also smaller than the corresponding sums over the individual regions, in this case because some small portions of the grid belong to different NERC regions at different times.
